Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Brian D. Burns v. Lowell V. Summerhays and Victor
Lawrence : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Victor Lawrence; Appearing as Pro Se Defendant/Appellant.
Ralph C. Petty; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Burns v. Summerhays, No. 950668 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6903

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
SOCKET NO. 3ZQLQioZ^£&~
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C., d/b/a
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 950668-CA
vs.
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and
VICTOR LAWRENCE,

Priority No.

15

Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT VICTOR LAWRENCE
APPEAL FROM THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE HONORABLE ROBIN REESE PRESIDING

Ralph C. Petty, Esq.,
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellee
Brian D. Burns D.C., d/b/a
Burns Chiropractic Clinic
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Victor Lawrence, Esq. ,
Appearing as Pro Se Defendant/
Appellant
10 West Broadway, Suite 211
Salt Lake City, Utah

FEB 2 0 1996

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C., d/b/a
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 950668-CA
vs.
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and
VICTOR LAWRENCE,
Defendants/Appellants•
BRIEF OF APPELLANT VICTOR LAWRENCE
APPEAL FROM THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE HONORABLE ROBIN REESE PRESIDING

Ralph C. Petty, Esq.,
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellee
Brian D. Burns D.C., d/b/a
Burns Chiropractic Clinic
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Victor Lawrence, Esq.,
Appearing as Pro Se Defendant/
Appellant
10 West Broadway, Suite 211
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

p

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

p

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

p

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, ETC.,

p

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

p

STATEMENT OF FACTS

p

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

p

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
BY ENDORSING A SETTLEMENT CHECK, DEPOSITING
THE SAME IN A TRUST ACCOUNT, AND DISBURSING
SUCH PROCEEDS THEREOF, APPELLANT LAWRENCE HAD
ENGAGED IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MR. WARD.

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT
LAWRENCE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, OR FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT, AT THE CONCLUSION
OF
PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF.

CONCLUSION

p.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

p.

ADDENDUM

p.

2

TABi

AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT Ul« ^ d UKlbDICTION
Rule

3

(i f

tlllii" Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure

confers

jurisdiction with the above-entitled Court" .
STATEMENT OF 1UBUUU
Issue #1:
Did

the

.ewe

:ourr

err

. *- -

»

accoun;
Lawrence,

.^^

- i.sbursing

hereafter

>e

x

v^»

f-^^^

^on^ludinn

^,-,^fM-<- i *^ ^

i

such proceeds thereof, Appellant: Vi ctor

Appellant

Lawrence,

*

had

in

xcjal

^nciuaiiig that * ^r ^' m u

viuiur

i nartips
proceeds .•; • ,ie personal jniun action

engaged

in

^^t.on

to +->*»

trvit he had the obligation

zeroise due diligence to discover the sciiiu1

Did +"h^

-^*~ -ourt err in deny i nq Appol 1 • 1111 iMiwr'pnr^'s iiiiii1 1 i n
• it i
l nil iii directed verdict p uL tlie conclusion oi

H e e ' s case in chief, inasmuch as Appellee's only claim to any
proceeds

wap

^urp^rted

^
"en

Appellant LoweiI

nave

arisen

executed

Summerhays?

3

by

frnnii
i

III V.s i ii n rur»111 ill
m

I

J .iiiJ

All three of the aforementioned issues were addressed in the
proceedings below.

See Record at 262, 265-8, 326-32.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, E T C ,
Rule 1.13 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, set forth in
the addendum.
The "Scope" of the Rules of Professional Conduct, set forth in
the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involved a dispute between the Appellee and the
above-named Appellants.

The Appellee claimed to have provided

chiropractic services to a certain John Ward.

An Assignment of

Benefits and a Doctor's Lien was executed by Mr. Ward and his
attorney of record, Appellant Summerhays.

Said documents were

executed in favor of "Spine Institute."
A settlement check was later received and deposited in the
trust account of Appellant Lawrence.

The total proceeds thereof

were later disbursed to Mr. Ward and Appellant Summerhays.
Appellee filed a complaint as Plaintiff in the lower court
seeking relief for promissory estoppel, fraud, malpractice, and
money had and received.

The first twp causes of action were

subsequently dismissed as against Appellant Lawrence.

See record

at 1-12, 50-52.
Appellee
complaint.

subsequently

was

granted

leave

to

amend

its

It sought for relief under additional claims of breach

of third-party beneficiary contract, and breach of express and
implied contract.

See record at 128.
4

Subsequently during the trial on this matter Appellee and
Appellant Summerhays stipulated to the dismissal of Appellant
Summerhays.

See record at 140-41.

The lower court entered findings and amended findings against
Appellant Lawrence.

It concluded that when Appellant Lawrence

endorsed the settlement check, deposited the same in his trust
account, and disbursed the proceeds thereof, he engaged in legal
representation of Mr. Ward.

It concluded further that Appellant

Lawrence had a legal duty to third parties in relation to the
proceeds of the personal injury action.
Appellee against Appellant Lawrence.

Judgment was awarded to

See record at 197-200, 192-

93.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Dr. Brian Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990.

2.

An Assignment of Benefits and a Doctor's Lien were

executed

by Mr. Ward

and his attorney

Summerhays in favor of "Spine Institute."
3.

of record, Appellant
See record at 9-10.

In the latter part of 1991, the personal injury action of

Mr. Ward was settled.

Appellant Summerhays negotiated that

settlement with the insurance company and instructed the insurance
company to make a check payable to Appellant Lawrence and Mr. Ward.
See record at 197-98.
4.

In September, 1991, Appellant Lawrence initiated a call

to Appellant Summerhays.

Appellant Summerhays and Appellant

Lawrence discussed the value of the personal injury claim of Mr.
Ward. Appellant Summerhays told Appellant Lawrence that Dr. Burns
5

had a lien against the settlement proceeds and informed Appellant
Lawrence of Appellant Summerhays' attorney's fees.

See record at

197-98.
5.

In December

of

1991, Appellant

Lawrence, Appellant

Summerhays, and Mr. Ward met in Appellant Lawrence's office.
meeting was arranged by Appellant Summerhays.

The

At that meeting,

Appellant Lawrence and Mr. Ward endorsed the settlement check. See
record at 197-98.
6.

Appellant Summerhays instructed Appellant Lawrence and

Mr. Ward to endorse the settlement check and instructed Appellant
Lawrence to deposit that check. After the check cleared, Appellant
Summerhays instructed Appellant Lawrence to distribute the proceeds
of the settlement, 38% to Appellant Summerhays and the balance to
Mr. Ward.
7.

See record at 197-98.
The insurance check was issued as full settlement of the

personal injury claim of Mr. Ward.
8.

In

compliance

with

the

See record at 197-98.
instructions

of

Appellant

Summerhays, Appellant Lawrence deposited the checks into his trust
account

and distributed

Summerhays.

the sums to Mr. Ward

and Appellant

Appellant Lawrence received no compensation from

either the settlement check, Mr. Ward, or Appellant Summerhays.
See record at 197-98.
9.

Dr. Burns was never paid for any claim which he may have

had against the aforementioned proceeds.

6

See record at 197-98.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court erroneously concluded that by endorsing a
settlement check, depositing the same in a trust account, and
disbursing such proceeds thereof, Appellant Lawrence had engaged in
legal representation of Mr. Ward.
From there the court concluded that once engaged in legal
representation Appellant Lawrence had a duty to third parties, to
ferret out claims of such third parties, to satisfy them and/or
hold proceeds until any dispute has been resolved.
The Appellee made these claims and the lower court granted
such relief even though there was never any legal standard shown to
have existed, and there was never any evidence presented to show
even that any claim had in fact been perfected.
Additionally, any claims purported to have existed by Appellee
against Appellant Lawrence arose out of a Doctor's Lien.

That

Doctor's Lien, however, was in the name of and for the benefit of
"Spine Institute", who was never a party to this action.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
BY ENDORSING A SETTLEMENT CHECK, DEPOSITING
THE SAME IN A TRUST ACCOUNT, AND DISBURSING
SUCH PROCEEDS THEREOF, APPELLANT LAWRENCE HAD
ENGAGED IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MR. WARD.

It is clear that Appellant Lawrence did not represent Mr. Ward
in any legal capacity prior to his involvement of or by endorsing
the aforementioned settlement check. Nonetheless, the lower court
concluded that by the very act of endorsing a settlement check,
depositing the same in one's trust account, and disbursing the
7

proceeds

thereof,

Appellant

Lawrence

had

engaged

in

legal

representation of Mr. Ward.
From there the lower court concluded that, having engaged in
legal representation of Mr. Ward, Appellant Lawrence was then under
a legal duty to third parties in relation to the proceeds of the
personal injury action. These duties included that he exercise due
diligence to discover

and satisfy third-party

claims on the

proceeds from the personal injury action and that he disburse
portions of the personal injury recovery to third parties to
satisfy their claims or to hold those sums in trust in the event
the third-party claims were disputed.
Appellee successfully argued that Rule 1.13 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct was dispositive in this regard.

A thorough

review of said rule and the comments thereafter, however, shows
clearly that although a lawyer ". . . may have a duty under
applicable law to protect such third-party claims . . ..H1 no
applicable law was ever shown to have existed before the lower
court.

Further, the

comment

itself

states

that

there

are

situations where a lawyer does not render legal services, such as
serving as an escrow agent.2

That very argument was raised and

improperly ignored by the lower court.

See record at 262-63.

Further the scope of those rules do not rise to the level of
creating even a presumption that any legal duty has been breached.
1

Rule 1.13, Comment, Rules of Professional Conduct, a copy
of which is included in the addendum and incorporated
herein.

2

Id
8

Relevant language is contained under the caption of "Scope" of said
rules, stating as follows.
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of
action, nor should it create any presumption that a legal
duty has been breached.
The Rules are designed to
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure
for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted
when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a
lawyer's self-assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer
under the administration of a disciplinary authority does
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the
Rule.
(Emphasis added) See "Scope" of the rules of
Professional Conduct, a copy of which is included in the
addendum and incorporated herein.
And if Appellant Lawrence did not in fact engage in legal
representation of Mr. Ward, then it only stands to reason that he
could not have been found to have held a legal duty to any third
parties in relation to those proceeds.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Appellant
Lawrence did in fact hold such a legal duty to third parties, that
duty can only be the exercise of due diligence, which is exactly
what Appellant Lawrence did.
No liens were perfected, no evidence was even presented to the
lower court in an effort to show that somehow Dr. Burns' lien was
perfected.
II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT
LAWRENCE'S NOTION TO DISMISS, OR FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT, AT THE CONCLUSION OP
PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF.

Appellee's only claim in the court below was that it had a
contractual right to the proceeds of any personal injury settlement
9

received on behalf of or relative to Mr. Ward.

It claimed that

this right arose from the Assignment of Benefits and the Doctor's
Lien which were both executed by Mr. Ward and Appellant Summerhays.
There is no dispute that if Appellee had no rights against Mr.
Ward or Appellant Summerhays it in no way could claim a right
against Appellant Lawrence.
Nonetheless, after Appellee concluded

its case

in chief

Appellant Lawrence moved the court to dismiss Appellee's claims
inasmuch as they appeared not to be the real party (ies) in
interest. The Doctor's Lien were between "Spine Institute" and Mr.
Ward and/or Appellant Summerhays.
There was absolutely no testimony presented
showing

any

Institute".

relationship

between

the

Appellee

or received
and

"Spine

It was only after the motion was made that Appellee's

counsel even attempted to proffer testimony showing a nexus between
the two entities.

The lower court denied appellant's motion even

though it was clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Indeed,

there was absolutely no evidence in any way showing that Appellee,
Brian D. Burns D.C., d/b/a Burns Chiropractic Clinic, had any
rights to or benefits from the aforementioned Doctor's Lien.3
The lower court somehow concluded that, because the name
"Brian

Burns,

D.C.

Chiropractic

Physician"

appeared

on

the

letterhead of the Spine Institute of Utah, it was enough to allow
Appellee the relief requested. In its reasoning it stated that Dr.

A copy of said Doctor's Lien is included in the addendum
and incorporated herein.
10

Burns had provided chiropractic services and therefore he was the
real party in interest.
Such reasoning, however, is fallacious. A "Robert E. Morrow,
M.D." also appears on said Doctor's Lien as an orthopedic surgeon.
The lower court capriciously ignored that and allowed Appellee to
sue.

The court completely

ignored the clear weight of the

evidence. There was absolutely no evidence showing who has a right
to sue on behalf of Spine Institute. There is absolutely no place
in the record below showing that Appellee is in fact "Spine
Institute11, or has any assignment from Spine Institute, or any
right to maintain the lawsuit on Spine Institute's behalf.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred when it held that Appellant Lawrence had
engaged in legal representation of Mr. Ward. It erred further when
it held that through such legal representation Appellant Lawrence
had a duty to third parties, to ferret out their claims and to
satisfy them.
There was no evidence even presented below to show that any
lien was in fact perfected.

It appears to have been only through

the court's erroneous interpretation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that the court declared that civil liability arose, even
though that is clearly beyond the scope of such rules.
Finally, Appellee presented their entire case, but failed to
produce any evidence that Appellee was in fact in any way related
to, or had an assignment from, Spine Institute, the only party who
could even remotely make an argument that it held a lien against
11

Mr. Ward and Appellant Summerhays and therefore vicariously against
Appellant Lawrence.
This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the lower
court's decision and deny Appellee its judgment for $2,992.33
against Appellant Lawrence.
DATED this

/£>"** day of -y> ^ ^ ^ c /

19 ?& .

awrence, Esq.,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
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19 <>c :

Ralph C. Petty, Esq.,
Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.14

COMMENT
A lawyer should hold property of others with
the care required of a professional fiduciary.
Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box,
except when some other form of safekeeping is
warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third
persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if
monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when
administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities.
Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If
there is risk t h a t the client may divert the
funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not
required to remit the portion from which the
fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not
hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the
lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of
the funds should be kept in trust, and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The
undisputed portion of the funds shall be
promptly distributed.

Third parties, such as a client's creditors,
may have just claims against funds or other
property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyor may
have a duty under applicable law to protect
such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client.
However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client
and the third party.
The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule
are independent of those arising from activity
other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is
governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render
legal services in the transaction.
A "client's security fund" provides a means
through the collective efforts of the Bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a
lawyer should participate.

CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 9-102(A)
provided that "funds of clients" are to be kept
in an identifiable bank account in the state in
which the lawyer's office is situated. DR
9-102Q3X2) provided t h a t a lawyer shall "identify and label securities and properties of a client ... and place them in ... safekeeping ...."
DR 9-102(B)(3) required t h a t a lawyer "maintain complete records of all funds, securities,
and other properties of a client ...." Rule

1.13(a) extends these requirements to property
of a third person that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with the representation.
Paragraph (b) is substantially similar to DR
9-102(B)(l), (3) and (4).
Paragraph (c) is similar to DR 9-102(A)(2),
except that the requirement regarding disputes applies to property concerning which an
interest is claimed by a third person as well as
by a client.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Attorney's assertion of retaining
lien as violation of ethical code or rules governing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974.

Rule 1.14. Declining or Terminating Representation.
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) The lawyer is discharged.
(b) A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client or
if:
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud;
(3) A client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning
that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;

and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other
adjudicative officer or arbitrator.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with
which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.
COMMENT
This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The
term "personally and substantial 1/' signifies
that a judge who was a member of a
multimember court and thereafter left judicial
office to practice law is not prohibited from
representing a client in a matter pending in
the court but in which the former judge did not
participate. So also the fact that a former judge
exercised administrative responsibility m a
court does not prevent the former judge from

acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge
had previously exercised remote or incidental
administrative responsibility that did not aff ec t the merits. Compare the Comment to Rule
L 1 1 > ^ e t g ^ "adjudicative officer" includes
8 U c h 0 Slcials as judges pro tempore, referees,
iaI m a s t e r 8 > h e a r i n g o{flcerg ^ d
other
p a r a j u d i c i a l offlcer3 ^
alg0 lawyer8 w h o
^ . ^ e jud
gerve ^
°

CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR
9-10KA), which provided that a lawyer "shall
not accept private employment in a matter
upon the merits of which he has acted in a
judicial capacity. Paragraph (a) differs, however, in that it is broader in scope and states
more specifically the persons to whom it applies. There was no counterpart in the Code to
paragraphs (b), (c) or (d).
With regard to arbitrators, EC 5-20 stated

that "a lawyer (who) has undertaken to act as
an impartial arbitrator or mediator . . . should
n o t thereafter represent in the dispute any of
^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ D R 9 . 1 0 l(A) did not perd e i f i c a t i o n applied to
waiyer
. ,
.
\ -..
x.
yr
former
J u d ^ e s by consent of the parties. Howev r
DR
*»
5-105(0 was similar m effect and
could be construed to permit waiver.

Rule 1.13. Safekeeping Property.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained
in the state where the lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent
of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five
years sifter termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person
has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person
any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to
receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render
a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property In which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and
severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective
interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the
dispute is resolved.

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
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concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private clientlawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may
have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or
whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in
state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these
officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer
could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to
represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a private lawyer would
not be authorized to do so. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts
and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and
in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or
incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that
whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation and the severity of
a sanction depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been
previous violations. Disciplinary action shall be governed by the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, and the burden of proof shall be on the State
Bar to sustain any allegation of violation by clear and convincng evidence.
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action, ogrjghould it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. TheRules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers ai^JjLproAlde-a^tiaictur e for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis
for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be" subverted
when they arftJnvoked by opposing parties ag_pi££gdural weap ^ns. The fact
that a Rule is a justbasis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for {'auctioning a
lawyefUnder the administration of a disciplinary-AUthorita-does not imply
that an lintagoniBt in a collateral prQceedingLQrJ;ransaction han standing to
seek enforcement of_the Rule, Accordingly, nothing in_theJftul€L-fihauld__be
deemed to augment any substantive legaljli^x_gflawy,erj3 jaiLthj^^aidisciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the client-lawyer or work product privilege. Tho3e privileges
were developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation. In
reliance on the client-lawyer privilege, clients are entitled to expect that
communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against
compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer privilege is that of the client and not
of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the
Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate
the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed
and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in
accordance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and work product privileges.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule
1.6 should not be Bubject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamination
would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with
law through assurances that communications will be protected against disclosure.
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide
general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation,
but the text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were prepared to
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An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a
profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to
practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of
parochial or self-interested concerns of the Bar. Every lawyer is responsible
for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid
in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest
which it serves.
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of
this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our
legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve
to define that relationship.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Professional Standards Versus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's
Dilemma, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 1.

SCOPE
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall' or "shall
not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline.
Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and de !ine areas
under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or a:ts within
the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships
between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and
disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing
in compliance with the Rules.
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That
context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licennure, laws
defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in
general. Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily
upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary,
upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal
rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from
the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested that
the lawyer render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there
are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may
attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any
specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of
fact.
Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority

Spine Institute of Utah
ROOT

BfitAN BURNS. O.C.

ffllffiN

RE: MEDICAL REPORTS AND DOCTOR'S LIEN
I do hurtbv authorize
SPINE INSTITUTE
to furnish you, my attorney, with a full
report of examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, etc., of myself in regarc to the accident which I
was recently involved.
I hereby authorize end direct you, my attorney, tc pay directly to said clinic such sums es may bo duo ond
owing to?* medical service rendered me both by reason of this accident end by raason of any other bills that
ere due the clinic end to withhold such Bums from any settlement, judgment or verdict es may be
necessary to adeausteiy protect said clinic. And I hereby further g»ve a Hen on my case to said clm»c
against eny and all proceeds of my settlement, judgment or verdict which may be paid tc you, my attorney,
or myself, as the result of the Injuries for which I have been treated o< injuries m connection therewith.
I agree never to rescind tins document and that a rescission will nor be honored by my attorney. I hereby
instruct that in the event another attorney is substituted in this matter, the new attorney honor this lien es
inherent to the settlement and enforceable upon the case es if i: were; executed by him.
I fully understand max I ?rn directly end fully responsible to Mid clinic for oil medical bills submitted for
service renaered me anc the: this agreement is made soley (or said clinic's additional protection and in
consideration of awaiting payment. And I further understand that such payment <s not contingent on any
settlement, judgment or verdict by wh»ch I may eventually recover sale fee.
Please acknowledge this letter by .signing below end returning to the Spine Institute I have been advised
that tf my attorney does net wish to cooperate m protecting the clinic's interest, the clinic will not await
payment but will reauire rne to make payments on a-current ba^s>
*
\ *k n
Dated

5 / / J-J\>

^uJtJLj

Patient's Signature

J *^

The undersigned being attorney of record for the above^tient ooes hereby agree to ooserve a!! the terms
of the above and agree.1; tc withhold Such cums from any settlement, judgment, or verdict 8$ may be
necess8rv to adequately protect said clinic above-named.

DtedljjLU

?ty

Attorney's *«?»««* <s£*>*^r

/

*

^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ " ^

Please sign, date, and return one copy to Spin© Institute. Also keep one copy for your records.
i: on PCt. i a n w l UntSD

*-<" nut i. D.
650 East 4500 South. Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 (801) 265-2700
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compare counterparts in the Code of Professional Responsibility (approved by
the Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected references to other authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not constitute
part of the Rules and are not intended to affect the application or interpretation of the Rules and Comments.

TERMINOLOGY
"Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed
the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.
"Consult" or "consultation" denotes cortimunication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter
in question.
"Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers
employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and
lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and
not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.
"Knowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
'Tartner" denotes a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law
firm organized as a professional corporation.
"Reasonable" or "reasonably," when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer,
denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
"Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
"Reasonably should know," when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that
a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter
in question.
"Substantial," when used in reference to degree or extent, denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.

Client-Lawyer Relationship
Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
COMMENT
Legal Knowledge

and Skill

In determining whether a lawyer employs
the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the
matter, the lawyer's general experience, the
lawyer's training and experience in the field in
question, the preparation and study the lawyer
is able to give the matter and whether it is
feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a
general practitioner. Expertise in a particular
field of law may be required in some circumstances.
A lawyer need not necessarily have special
training or prior experience to handle legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is

unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as
competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the
analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all
legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental
legal skill consists of determining what kind of
legal problems a situation may involve, a skiU
that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field
through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in
the field in question.
In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or
assistance in a matter in which the lawyer
does not have the skill ordinarily required
where referral to or consultation or association

DATED t h i s

2SL

c a y of

September,
By t h e / C o u r t s

Robin\Wc>Ree^e,

x&--

Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATED^.,
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, this
day of September, 1995:
Victor Lawrence
Att ^rney at Law
10 West Broadway, Suite 311
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C. d/b/a

:

BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,

:

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

:

v.
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and
VICTOR LAWRENCE

:
:

Civil No.

#30004651 CV

Judge Jtee^e
Defendants.
The

:

above-entitled

matter

c^ue

on

regularly

before

the

Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial had in this
matter, the Court having reviewed the files and records herein,
having received the testimony of the witnesses, having received the
arguments

of

counsel,

having

reviewed

the

legal

authority

presented, and for good cause appearing, therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be

entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of
$2,060.00, plus prejudgment interest of $858.33, plus costs of
$74.00,

for a total

judgment

of $2,992.33, plus

post-judgment

interest to accrue at the legal rate of 9.22 percent per annum.

settled.

Mr.

Summerhays

negotiated

that

settlement

with

the

insurance company and instructed the insurance company to make a
check payable to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward.
5.

In September, 1991, Mr. Lawrence initiated a call to Mr.

Summerhays.

Mr. Summerhays and Mr. Lawrence discussed the value of

the personal injury claim of Mr. Ward.

Mr. Summerhays told Mr.

Lawrence that Dr. Burns had a lien against the settlement proceeds
and informed Mr. Lawrence of Mr. Summerhays' attorney's fees.
6.

In December, 1991, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Summerhays, and Mr.

Ward met in Lawrence's office.
Summerhays.

The meeting was arranged by Mr.

At that meeting, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward endorsed

the settlement check.
7.

Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward to

endorse the settlement check and instructed Mr. Lawrence to deposit
that check. After the check cleared, Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr.
Lawrence to distribute the proceeds of the settlement, 3 8 percent
to Mr. Summerhays and the balance to Mr. Ward.
8.

The insurance check was issued as full settlement of the

personal injury claim of Mr. Ward.
9.
Lawrence

In compliance with the instructions of Mr. Summerhays, Mr.
deposited

the

checks

into

his

trust

account

and

distributed the sums to Mr. Ward and Mr. Summerhays.
10.

Dr. Burns has never been paid on the lien or claim which

he had against the proceeds of the personal injury action of Mr.
Ward.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. When Mr. Lawrence endorsed the settlement check, deposited

Oj! |Au,s

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686

• »%C

u

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C. d/b/a
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,

AMENDFD FINDING'S OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil $o.

LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and
VICTOR LAWRENCE
:

930004651 CV

Judge Reece

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter catme on regularly before the
Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial setting in the
above-entitled matter.

Testimony was received by the Court on May

15, 1995, and again on August 15, 1995.

The court having reviewed

the files and records herein, having received the testimony of the
witnesses, having received the arguments of counsel and for good
cause appearing, therefore does hereby issue the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Dr. Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990.

2.

To insure payment, Dr. Burns received an assignment of

benefits and a doctor's lien from Mr. Ward.
3.

The lien was signed by Mr. Ward and by Mr. Summerhays or

some member of Mr. Summerhays' office staff.
4.

Late in 1991, the personal injury action o^ Mr. Ward was

•y\S. OF u'r'/...
DATED t h i s

/_>

day of O c t o b e r ,—199 5%,

'A

UBy:the
UByi _ .Courts : >l

W

\&

NX

V

Robi%^jti^.e^e, Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Victor Lawrence, 10 West Broadway Suite 311,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this
October, 1995.

day of

it in his trust account, and disbursed the proceeds of the personal
injury settlement, he engaged in legal representation of Mr. Ward.
2.

Mr. Lawrence had a legal duty to third parties in relation

to the proceeds

of the personal

injury action.

These duties

include:
a.

That he exercise due diligence

to discover and

satisfy third-party claims on the proceeds from the personal injury
action.
b.

That he disburse portions of the personal injury

recovery to third parties to satisfy their claims or to hold those
sums in trust in the event the third-party claims were disputed.
3. Mr. Lawrence breached this duty by disbursing the proceeds
of the Ward personal injury action to Mr. Summerhays and Mr. Ward
and failing to discover the claims of third parties on the personal
injury proceeds when he had actual notice of the claim and lien of
Dr. Burns.
4.

Mr. Lawrence

received

no

remuneration

for his legal

services provided to Mr. Ward in relation to the proceeds from the
personal injury action.

However, this lack of remuneration has no

bearing on or affect on damages.
5.

Mr. Lawrence is liable to Dr. Burns for his lien in the

amount of $2,060.00, plus prejudgment interest from June 27, 1991
until the entry of this judgment, in the amount of $858.33 through
August 27, 1995, plus costs in the amount of $74.00, for a total
judgment of $2,992.33, and post-judgment interest to accrue at the
legal rate of 9.22 percent per annum.

